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ABSTRACT Physical Layer Secure Key Generation (PL-SKG) schemes have received a lot of attention
from the wireless security community in recent years because of the potential benefits that they could
bring to the security landscape. These schemes aim to strengthen current security protocols by reducing
the amount of key material that devices need for deployment. They do this by harnessing the common
source of randomness provided by the wireless channel that the physical layer is communicating over.
This is of particular importance in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) where resources are particularly
scarce and where issues such as key revocation and recovery make the design of efficient key management
schemes extremely difficult. This paper discusses the issues and challenges encountered in the design and
implementation of PL-SKG schemes on off-the-shelf wireless sensor networks. It then proposes a novel
key generation scheme that takes advantage of both the power and simplicity of classic error correcting
codes and also the diversity of frequency channels available on 802.15.4 compliant nodes to generate keys
from received signal strength (RSS) readings. This paper shows that our key generation and refreshment
scheme can achieve a near 100% key reconciliation rate whilst also providing perfect forward and backward
security.
INDEX TERMS Key Refreshment, Physical Layer Security, Secure Key Generation, Wireless Sensor
Networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have grown in popu-
larity over the last few decades because of their relatively
low cost and their ease of deployment but such networks
pose significant design challenges because of their limited
computational prowess and their short battery life [1] [2]. In
the context of wireless security, WSNs pose significant chal-
lenges because their limited capabilities render conventional
key management techniques such as public key cryptogra-
phy based schemes impractical. Elliptic curve cryptography
(ECC) based schemes implemented on WSN nodes such as
TinyECC [3] will, for example, consume significant energy
resources and even then a single operation will still take a
long time to compute [4].
Physical Layer Secure Key Generation (PL-SKG) schemes
aim to address the challenges highlighted above by enabling
a key to be generated and refreshed in a relatively lightweight
manner [5] [6]. They achieve this feat by exploiting the
diversity and inherent randomness of the wireless channel
that the physical layer is communicating over to generate
keys. Another key advantage of PL-SKG schemes is that
they use secondary packet information (e.g Receive Signal
Strength (RSS), Link Quality Indicators (LQI), Automatic
Gain Control (AGC) Information e.t.c) to generate keys.
Hence, the same packets that are being exchanged during
the key generation process could still be used to carry other
application specific information that nodes may wish to
exchange, and in so doing preserving bandwidth.
The work in this area stems primarily from initial work by
Mathur et al. [7] and Azimi-Sadjadi et al. [8] showing that
given that there is a fading channel between two communi-
cating parties, a common secret key could be extracted by
those two parties. Following this, there have been a number
of studies that looked into this issue in the WSN domain.
This work has mainly consisted of looking at only mobile
WSNs although work in [4] was the first to look at static
channels (i.e where nodes are not moving). Despite the
progress that has been made in these areas, there is still a
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number of limitations like unguaranteed key establishment
in all environments which hamper the wide spread adoption
of these schemes. Some of these issues have been addressed
by the PL-SKG scheme proposed in this paper.
PL-SKG schemes usually start with a process of sampling a
wireless channel and observing some physical layer parame-
ter. After repeated observations of the parameter of interest,
these schemes formulate a common key using their respective
observations. However, it is likely that the keys generated by
two different parties contain some disagreed bits. This key
bit disagreement needs to be reconciled before the key can
be used. Current state-of-the-art practical implementations
for WSNs usually accomplish this task by exchanging some
information that characterises the structure of the keys they
have just generated. This can be a big security risk as it
may allow an adversary to obtain and recover portions of
the key given particular channel conditions. In addition to
this, current RSS based PL-SKG schemes quantise the RSS
directly which can cause key disagreements if the commu-
nicating parties are using very different transmit powers.
After reconciliation, the process moves onto the privacy
amplification stage where the reconciled keys are usually
hashed to ensure that the key entropy is spread evenly across
the entire key size. This can then be followed by a challenge-
response to ensure generated cryptographic keys agree at
both ends.
Motivated by the above limitations, this paper proposes
a new lightweight PL-SKG protocol for static networks,
which uses Error Correcting Codes (ECCs) to reconcile
keys in a secure manner that does not involve leaking any
information about the formulated keys. The scheme also
ensures that transmit power mismatches between nodes do
not hinder the key generation process by not directly using
the quantised RSS values for key formulation. The scheme
uses ECCs to carry out the key reconciliation process and
in so doing not revealing anything about the structure of
the RSS samples. This provides an improvement on current
WSN PL-SKG schemes as no information that characterises
the RSS samples accumulated by legitimate parties during
the randomness sharing phase needs to exchanged in the key
reconciliation phase.
The main novel contributions of this paper are to
• Propose a novel, robust and practical PL-SKG scheme
for static WSNs, which uses ECCs to generate and/or re-
fresh keys whilst not leaking any information to a local
adversary. This is in contrast to the iterative quantisation
techniques that are usually used in current WSN PL-
SKG schemes.
• Highlight the many implementation issues that arise
when implementing PL-SKG schemes on off-the-shelf
devices. Many of these issues have not been discussed
in detail in existing literature.
• Provide real PL-SKG implementation results of the
proposed scheme and evaluate outcomes.
This paper is structured as follows. Section II takes a look
at related work. Section III gives the system and adversarial
models used in our scheme. Section IV presents a broad
overview of our proposed PL-SKG scheme. Sections V,
VI and VII then provide detailed descriptions of our pro-
posed PL-SKG scheme’s randomness sharing, information
reconciliation and privacy amplification stages, respectively.
Section VIII discusses the implementation of the scheme and
evaluates its outcomes. Lastly section IX ends the paper by
concluding and briefly discussing further work.
II. RELATED WORK
There are a lot of challenges that face PL-SKG. The most
important ones are reliability of the key generation process
and susceptibility to physical layer attacks such as jamming,
channel manipulation and man in the middle attacks [9].
There has been a lot of research work looking into PL-SKG
in WSNs in the past few years. Most of the research focuses
on using RSS as a source of randomness for practical key
generation. This is most likely owing to the relative ease of
getting hold of RSS information as opposed to other channel
state information (CSI) such as the channel response (h) on
standard 802.15.4 compliant wireless nodes.
The work in [10] [11] considers key generation between mo-
bile nodes using RSS as the source of common randomness
and under many different topologies. It focuses on exploiting
not only the wireless channel between two nodes but also the
deployment environment, in which multiple nodes might be
deployed, and the mobility of the nodes to generate group
keys over the physical layer.
The paper [12] proposes a physical layer key generation
scheme that uses nodes fitted with a special Espar antenna.
The general idea is that by varying the reactances (amplitude
and phase characteristics) of the Espar antennas at both
ends of the communication channel, the variation of the
received RSS at both ends can be induced to achieve a high
key generation rate even on a static channel. This exploits
not only the variation in the wireless channel but also the
variation in the effective receive and transmit power that an
Espar antenna experiences in the reactance domain. These
variations can be exploited by building a RSS profile under
different reactance values, which is used as a basis for SKG.
The main problem with using the channel response as the
basis for SKG in WSNs like the above existing approaches
is that the channel response will not be available to higher
layers on off-the-shelf (OTS) WSN devices. This forces
practical SKG schemes in WSNs to resort to using coarse
measures of channel randomness such as signal received
strength (RSS). Such schemes include those in [13] and
[4] which generate keys over the physical layer using RSS
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measurements. They attempt to induce variability in static
channels by switching between multiple channels centred at
different frequencies. These proposed schemes have the dis-
advantage of requiring that the information that characterises
the structure of the generated keys needs to be exchanged
as part of the key reconciliation process. They also use the
quantised RSS directly in the key generation process and so
transmit power mismatches between communicating parties
lead to high key disagreement rates. This paper aims to
rectify these problems.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
A. WIRELESS CHANNEL MODEL
PL-SKG schemes aim to generate cryptographic keys by
observing the physical channel between two nodes and using
the channel as a common source of randomness upon which
to generate keys. The wireless channel is modelled as being
comprised of two main components: i) a multiplicative fading
lossh (which we will in this text just refer to as the ‘channel’)
and ii) an additive noise component n. When a node nalice
sends a symbol x to another node nbob, nbob receives a noisy
signal yab where yab = hab ∗ x + nab with ∗ being the
convolution operation. Conversely, when nbob sends x to
nalice, nalice receives yba = hba ∗ x + nba [14].
The additive noise components nab and nba are independent
random variables, so they can not be used as a common
source of randomness [15] [16]. For a static channel, the
fading components hab and hba stay highly correlated over a
coherence bandwidth (Bc) because of the channel reciprocity
principle. If the frequency used by nalice and nbob is within
that band, then hab ≈ hba.
In the case of a non-static mobile channel, channel fading
will stay highly correlated for time intervals shorter than the
coherence time tc provided that the frequency remains within
the band Bc (where tc is directly proportional to the relative
speed at which nodes move). A third node neve which is
a distance d away from nbob and receiving a noisy signal
from nalice will receive yae = hae ∗ x + nae, where hae
decorrelates with respect to hab as d increases. At a distance
d ≥ λ/2 (where λ is the wavelength of the transmitted
signal), it can be shown that the fading components seen by
nalice and nbob will be largely independent of hae making
it impossible for neve to estimate hab from that position.
Figure 1 shows the relationship between channels between
nalice, nbob and neve.
The central idea behind PL-SKG is to utilise this channel
reciprocity to generate cryptographic keys. Particularly, be-
cause the legitimate channel (hab) will be in deep fade at
different locations to the eavesdropper channel (hae), nalice
and nbob can use the knowledge of the channel’s deep fading
characteristics to generate keys.
nalice nbob
neve
hab
hae hbe
Alice Bob
Eve
FIGURE 1. Channels between nalice, nbob and neve.
B. ADVERSARIAL MODEL
It is important to outline the assumptions made about the
adversary’s computational and physical advantages just as
in conventional cryptographic protocols. The adversary in
this case is modelled as being active and in the reception
range of all packets exchanged between nalice and nbob. The
adversary, neve, is also assumed to be at a distance greater
than 2m from both nalice and nbob. If the adversary is too
close to nalice and nbob then the adversary’s channel might
correlate with legitimate party channels. The adversary is
also capable of both power limited indiscriminate jamming
of the 2.4GHz spectrum and also capable of flooding the
wireless channel.
Given the assumptions above, the attacker must not be able
to recover the common key generated by nalice and nbob or
use a compromised session key to calculate session keys that
were used prior to or after the compromised session.
IV. OVERVIEW OF PROPOSED PL-SKG SCHEME
The proposed PL-SKG scheme consists of three main stages
as shown in Figure 2. These are i) randomness sharing,
ii) key reconciliation, and iii) privacy amplification. In the
randomness sharing phase, nalice and nbob tradeNi messages
over Nj different frequencies. They then filter and process
those samples as shown in Figure 2 to formulate an initial
key.
In the key reconciliation stage, that key is reconciled using
ECCs. This process involves nalice generating a random
number and encoding it with an ECC. A one-time pad is
then performed with the encoded random number and the
key that has been generated by nalice and the result is sent
over the wireless channel to nbob. nbob then processes the
information received as shown in Figure 2 to reconcile its
key with the key generated by nalice. After both nalice and
nbob have generated the keys, the process moves on to the
privacy amplification stage.
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The privacy amplification stage serves two main purposes,
i) to ensure perfect forward and backward security and
ii) to ensure that the final key has bits which are well
distributed. To achieve this goal, the privacy amplification
stage formulates the key in such a way that a new session
key forms a hash chain that uses both the previous key and
the hashed value of the current physical layer generated key
as arguments. Formulating the current session key in this
manner makes it impossible for an intruder with knowledge
of compromised session key Ki to compute the key that was
used prior to or afterKi. The details of these three stages will
be presented in the separate sections below.
V. RANDOMNESS SHARING & QUANTISATION
Randomness sharing is arguably the most important stage
in the PL-SKG process because it is the stage when a
physical layer parameter (in our case the RSS) is observed.
In this section we will first look at the limitations and the
implementation issues that arise when using OTS 802.15.4
compliant WSNs. We will then briefly investigate the impact
that channel fading has on the variability of static WSN
channels, before detailing the full procedure for randomness
sharing used in our proposed PL-SKG scheme.
A. IMPLEMENTATION ISSUES WITH RANDOMNESS
SHARING ON REAL NODES
A WSN node consists of sensors, a transceiver and a mi-
crocontroller. A user wishing to deploy a PL-SKG scheme
has the option of i) performing the entire key generation
procedure in hardware within the transceiver where all the
other physical layer tasks are performed, or ii) just sampling
a physical layer parameter from the transceiver and using that
parameter as a source of randomness for a key generation
procedure taking place in the microcontroller. Opting for
the former solution would mean using the transceiver with
physical layer functions for key generation built in, which
would hinder quick adoption and deployment of the scheme.
The latter option involves employing a current 802.15.4 com-
pliant transceiver (such as the popular CC2420 transceiver
[17] used in TeloB WSN nodes) which is used in nodes to
sample a physical layer variable such as the RSS and have
the other stages of SKG implemented as software on the
microcontroller. This approach has been the most popular
one used in practical WSNs and was adopted in [4] [10].
The most useful and hence most intuitive channel parameter
to use as a shared source of randomness between two parties
is the channel response (or multiplicative fading loss) h.
The channel response encapsulates the amplitude and phase
changes that a transmitted signal goes through whilst travel-
ling through the wireless medium. The channel response also
has two degrees of freedom upon which to generate keys -
the channel amplitude and the channel phase - and will thus
yield a better key generation rate than parameters with just
one degree of freedom. When trying to generate physical
layer keys using OTS transceivers, the channel response will
be most likely unavailable, so another parameter such as
the RSS might be used instead. OTS transceivers do not
compute and pass on a channel response estimate because
it is not directly needed for communication to occur so it
does not warrant the additional computational resources it
would take to estimate and provide it. Even if the channel
response was estimated and provided on a symbol-by-symbol
basis, a device running at a frequency much higher than a
microcontroller’s frequency would be needed to sample the
values.
B. SOURCES OF CHANNEL FADING IN WSNS
PL-SKG schemes rely on sampling the channel response
h and thus the rate at which we can generate keys at the
physical layer is limited by how much the channel varies in
time, frequency and space. If a node is moving, the frequency
received will differ from the frequency transmitted according
to the formula 1 below because of the Doppler shift [18,
p. 47]. The relationship between the receive and transmit
frequencies fRX and fTX is defined below:
fRX = fTX + ∆f
= fTX +
||~v(t)||
λ
cos θ(t)
= fTX + fMAX cos θ(t)
(1)
Here,
−−→
v(t) is the relative velocity between the two nodes, λ is
the wavelength of the transmitted wave, θ(t) is the angle of
signal arrival at time t, and fMAX is the maximum Doppler
shift.
This shift causes a time-varying channel and fast fading.
The coherence time tc is the time interval where we have
fRX ≈ fTX. In the case of mobile nodes, this variability can
be exploited to generate keys by sampling the channel every t
seconds where t > tc. In the case of static nodes, where
−−→
v(t)
= 0, there is no time-varying channel fading, so the channel
remains largely unchanged for a long period, which reduces
the key generation capacity.
There is also an opportunity to exploit the frequency selective
characteristics of a channel to generate keys. Frequency
selectivity is caused by the propagating environment in which
the nodes are communicating and the rate at which nodes are
transmitting data. Frequency selectivity when transmitting
symbols over a channel is caused by multipath propagation
which causes time dispersion, leading to Inter-Symbol In-
terference (ISI). Multipath propagation results in different
copies of a signal to take different paths from a transmitter
to a receiver. Since these paths are of different lengths, they
arrive at the receiver at different times and cause ISI.
The coherence bandwidth is a statistical measurement of
the range of frequencies over which the channel can be
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Alice Bob
SampleChannel()
SampleChannel()
Randomness Sharing
i
=
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N
i
j
=
1,
..
.,
N
j
Vij = getRSSI(Samplei)
V j = 1Ni
∑Ni
i=1 Vij
V = Filter(V j)
KA = Match(V )
i=
1
,...,N
i
j
=
1,...,N
jVij = getRSSI(Samplei)
V j = 1Ni
∑Ni
i=1 Vij
V = Filter(V j)
KB = Match(V)
S
Key Reconcilliation
r = randomNumber()
S = KA ⊕ C(r)
S ⊕KB = C(r)⊕ e
r = C−1(C(r)⊕ e)
⇒ KˆA = C(r)⊕ S
{KA} {KB}
Encode r with an
error correcting code
e is the number of disagreeing bits between
KA and KB . If e is small then r can be re-
covered from C(r) ⊕ e
Privacy Amplification
kiw = KA kiw = KˆA
fi = h(fi−1||kiw) fi = h(fi−1||kiw)
KiAB = h(Ki−1AB ||fi||r||i) KiAB = h(Ki−1AB ||fi||r||i)
{KA, r} {KˆA, r}
FIGURE 2. Figure Showing Key Generation and Refreshment Process.
considered flat. The X% coherence bandwidth is defined in
[19, p. 47] as being equal to the value of ∆f such that:
X
100
=
E {h(f) ∗ h(f + ∆f)}
E {|h(f)|2} (2)
Here,X is the correlation factor, h(f) is the channel response
at frequency f , |h(f)| is the channel gain and E{x} is the
expectation of random variable x. The 50% and the 90%
coherence bandwidth, for example, can be shown to be equal
to 1/5στ and 1/50στ respectively. Here, στ is the delay
spread.
For a channel to be very frequency selective, we usually need
to have a signal bandwidth greater than the 50% channel
coherence bandwidth, namely we need Bs > BC,50. In non-
line-of-sight indoor WSNs we will typically have the value
of στ in the range from≈ 8ns to≈18ns [20] and an allocated
bandwidth of 2MHz per channel in 802.15.4 networks. Hence
we can see that even if we take the most severe case of delay
spread given as 18ns in [20] we have BC,50 ≈ 11 MHz.
This means that just one channel does not provide enough
frequency dependent variation to base key generation on, but
if we use the entire spectrum of available 802.15.4 channels
we can exploit the fact that each individual channel has a
different frequency response to generate keys.
The above problem with static channels not having a lot of
variability is a key challenge when trying to formulate PL-
SKG schemes for WSNs as nodes are usually non-mobile and
utilise low bandwidths. A common approach to circumvent-
ing this problem is to induce variability at the nodes by limit-
ing the schemes to mobile nodes [10], switching transmission
channels [4] or altering hardware characteristics every time
we sample the channel [12]. The presence of some frequency
selective fading means that we can exploit the variability
of slow fading loss (Lp) at different centre frequencies by
switching between different frequency channels.
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C. RANDOMNESS SHARING IN PROPOSED PL-SKG
SCHEME
The scheme we propose alternatively hops between L chan-
nels according to a pre-determined frequency hopping sched-
ule S known to both nodes nalice and nbob and computes
the mean RSS on each channel at each end. In order for the
nodes to generate keys they need to change their frequency
channels synchronously, and the frequency hopping schedule
S helps them do that. The schedule also plays an important
part in ensuring that the generated keys vary with time even
in static channels. Going through the key generation process
multiple times in quick succession will still produce different
keys because the set of channels used and the order in which
they are used will change with each iteration according to
the synchronised schedule S. The generation of S can be
arbitrary and so legitimate parties can easily generate S by
seeding a pseudo number generator and iterating it after every
sample period.
After this, the samples are first processed by removing the
direct current (DC) component in the samples (this involves
calculating the mean of the samples and then deducting that
mean from each sample value). The average value (i.e mean)
of the resulting samples after this processing will then be
zero. This is done so that the differences in transmit powers
between nalice and nbob do not affect the key generation
process. After this, each value in the resulting sequence is
matched and swapped with its gray code equivalent. Convert-
ing to gray code helps minimise bit disagreement between
nalice and nbob by ensuring that the difference between any
two adjacent values is zero.
After this we take our bit sequence and use it to formulate
a weak key. In this case we will define the weak key as the
intermediate key that comes out as a result of the randomness
sharing phase and is used in the key reconciliation process.
If we need a longer weak key, we can change the schedule
S and repeat the process above to get another longer bit se-
quence. We can repeat this process until we have the required
number of bits in our weak key, although the longer the key
required the higher the energy cost. The rationale behind
formulating weak keys in this way and not just using directly
quantised values is to further add resilience to transmit power
differences between nodes that would otherwise cause mis-
matches and to increase the key variability between sessions.
The randomness sharing procedure is shown in algorithm 1.
VI. INFORMATION RECONCILIATION
Information reconciliation is the process of using quantised
values of a physical parameter to generate a common key be-
tween two communicating parties. This stage aims to reduce
the bit errors between two communicating nodes by having
the nodes share some information that would help them
reconcile their keys. The main existing approaches proposed
of doing this include the use of error correcting codes or the
exchange of some information regarding the quantisation of
Input: Channel Frequency Hopping Schedule S
Result:KRS - Key from Randomness Sharing Stage
for each channel index j ∈ [1, Nj ] do
Channel Frequency← S(j);
for each sample number i ∈ [1, Ni] do
Vij ← getRSSI(Samplei);
end
V j = (1/Ni)×
∑Ni
i=1 Vij ;
end
V = (1/Nj)×
∑Nj
j=1 V j ;
for each channel index j ∈ [1, Nj ] do
KRS(j)← convertToMatchingGrayCode(V j - V );
end
Algorithm 1: Pseudocode for Randomness Sharing Stage
keys to help reconcile keys. The former approach is popular
in 802.11 networks (particularly using LDPC (Low Den-
sity Parity Check) codes (ECCs) or BCH (Bose-Chaudhuri-
Hocquenghem) codes) whilst the later approach is popular in
a WSN setting.
The use of the ECCs process involves nalice choosing a
random number, r, encoded with an error correcting code
C, performing a one-time pad with its key Ka to create a
syndrome S, and sending it to nbob. nbob then performs a one-
time pad with its key Kb to get an estimate of the encoded
data and then uses it to compute Ka. More formally, the
above process can be defined as follows:
Alice :
s = C(r)⊕Ka
Bob :
rˆ = Decode(s⊕Kb)
= Decode(C(r)⊕Ka ⊕Kb)
= Decode(C(r)⊕ e)
= r (if HD(e,0) < some threshold t)
=⇒ Kˆa = C(rˆ)⊕ s
(3)
Here, the bitwise ⊕ operation is the exclusive OR operation,
e is the error vector and HD(a, b) is the hamming distance
(i.e the number of disagreeing bits) between numbers a and
b.
The choice of ECC in a WSN setting will depend on the
required key length as different codes have different decoding
capabilities and resource requirements. The hamming code,
for example, is fairly easier than other resource intensive
codes such as LDPC codes to implement but it will only have
a decoding threshold of t = (dmin − 1)/2, where dmin is
the minimum distance between codes, whilst LDPC codes
can correct many more errors as the key size increases but
consumes more resources because of its iterative decoding
6 VOLUME 4, 2016
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI
10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2806423, IEEE Access
Moara-Nkwe et al.: Preparation of Papers for IEEE TRANSACTIONS and JOURNALS
process.
The chosen ECC needs to be able to correct errors but it
should not be able to correct a large number of errors. If
the ECC can correct a large number of errors then it may be
possible for neve to reconcile its key with nalice even though
the difference between their keys is fairly large. Hamming
and Polynomial codes have the advantage of having a clearly
defined error correcting capability, so we know that they
will only be able correct errors up to a fixed threshold.
Polynomial codes are similar to hamming codes in terms of
both error correction capability and resource intensiveness,
so we propose the use of either hamming codes or polynomial
codes for error correction.
Polynomial codes create a codeword c(x) by using the
original message vector m(x) and a primitive polynomial
g(x), where c(x), m(x) and g(x) are all in polynomials with
coefficients belonging to the Galois field of two elements (i.e
GF(2)). The code can correct one bit error in the received
message r(x) by computing the remainder after dividing r(x)
with g(x). This can be seen below:
c(x) = m(x)g(x)
r(x) = c(x) + e(x)
rem
(
r(x)
g(x)
)
= rem
(
c(x) + e(x)
g(x)
)
= rem
(
e(x)
g(x)
)
Here, e(x) is the error monomial. The set of all values
of rem
(
xi
g(x)
)
for all i (i.e. for all error monomials) is
precomputed and stored in a look-up table and thus the error
location i can be computed at the receiver provided only a
one bit error has occurred.
A hamming code is specified by a generator matrix G and
a parity check matrix H such that HGT = 0. The code is
computed as c = mG and the received vector ~r = ~c + ~e is
decoded by first computing a value called the syndrome, s ,
by s = HrT and comparing which column of parity check
matrix H matches with s. Here, the message vector is m and
the error vector is e. The matched column is the error location
of the single bit error. If s = 0, then there is no error. A
polynomial code with a message length k and a code length
n can be represented as a cyclic hamming code by setting:
G =
(
g(x) xg(x) ... xkg(x)
)T (4)
H =
( (
rem
(
x1
g(x)
))T
...
(
rem
(
xn
g(x)
))T )
(5)
The design of our proposed scheme uses a series of Hamming
codes with an additional parity bit with a code length of n =
8 and message length k = 4 to achieve error correction. Using
a small code length helps keep the complexity of the key
reconciliation stage low. The key is first interleaved by using
a (4 × 8) block interleaver before encoding. Interleaving is
used in order to make the ECC more robust to burst errors so
the scheme works even if a particular segment of the key has
a high density of errors.
The interleaved key is first divided into n chunks, and each
chunk is then padded with a Hamming code encoded random
bit sequence (C(r)) to form a set of syndromes. Afterwards,
these syndromes are then sent from node nalice to node nbob
for nbob to carry out key reconciliation. When nbob first
receives the set of syndromes, nbob performs the following
for each syndrome. nbob first tries to recover the original
encoded key segment by performing a one time pad of the
received syndrome with the key that nbob has measured.
After performing this operation, nbob will obtain the original
encoded random number withHD(e, 0) errors, where e is the
error vector (Ka ⊕Kb).
Using the error vector e, nbob can then recover the origi-
nal error free encoded random sequence C(r) by decoding
C(r) ⊕ e to get r and then encoding the result to recover
C(r). After this, the key measured by nalice can be recovered
by computing C(r) ⊕ s. The random number, r (which is
encoded to create C (r)), is generated using the Park-Miller
Minimal Standard Generator. The Park-Miller Minimal Stan-
dard Generator is a multiplicative linear congruential gen-
erator (r = (a × s) mod (231 − 1)) with a = 16007 and
the initial seed value s sourced by our scheme from the
lower bits of the transceiver’s automatic gain control (AGC)
magnitude register (the transceiver datasheet specifies that
these lower bits can be used for random number generation).
After error correction both nalice and nbob can then proceed
to the privacy amplification stage.
VII. PRIVACY AMPLIFICATION
The general idea behind privacy amplification is to ensure
that if the number of bits in the key generated after reconcil-
iation by a key generation scheme is greater than the entropy
of the key, we need to adjust the size of the key so that it
aligns well with the entropy of the key. Take for example
the following reconciled 32 bit key, KAB , that was quantised
by looking at the number of deep fades that a chip sequence
experienced whilst travelling over a channel (deep fade = 0):
KAB = 10111101111111111110111011111101
H(KAB) = length(KAB)×(
Pr(0) log2
1
Pr(0)
+ Pr(1) log2
1
Pr(1)
)
<< length(KAB)
(6)
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Here, H(KAB) is the entropy of KAB . So we need to have
the key to be of length l ≈ H(KAB) < length(KAB) for the
key to have a level of cryptographic security that corresponds
to its length. This can be done by using privacy extractors
or by hashing the long key and choosing the first n bits of
H(KAB) as the final key KAMP.
KAB = 10111101111111111110111011111101
KAMP = h(KAB)|BIT (n−1)BIT 0
(7)
The calculations above assume neve observes a completely
decorrelated channel from nalice and nbob. In order to eval-
uate n we would need to know neve’s channel statistics and
thus in our scheme we take n as being equal to length(KAB)
meaning that the resultant generated key will have a length
that is longer than its true entropy. This keeps the complexity
and hence the computational cost low.
In our proposed key generation scheme, we propose that
the privacy amplification should be done in a way that the
generated keys refresh the current session key to formulate
the next session key and in so doing form a hashed key
chain. In other words, a physical layer generated key in this
time instance is a function of all the previous keys that have
ever been generated. This can be achieved by computing
the final key KiAB using the previous session key K
i−1
AB ,
reconciled weak key kiw, the recovered random number r and
the iteration number i as:
KiAB = h(K
i−1
AB ||fi||r||i)
fi = h(fi−1||kiw)
(8)
Here, fi is a hash chain of reconciled weak keys, with
f0 = h(k
0
w). fi is used to ensure that only a node with knowl-
edge of all previous key generation sessions can generate the
next session key. After nalice and nbob have derived a key,
challenge-response authentication can then be undertaken to
make sure the two generated keys agree. If the two keys do
not agree then key generation can be attempted again. This
will prevent key error propagation, where one error leads to
more errors in the subsequent keys. The derived KiAB can
then be used for communication between nalice and nbob.
VIII. IMPLEMENTATION, EVALUATION AND
COMPARISION
In order to evaluate the practicality of our proposed PL-
SKG scheme and compare it with the most relevant existing
method in [4] as will be elaborated later, we have imple-
mented them using the NesC language [21] on a pair of
TelosB WSN nodes running the TinyOS operating system.
Experiments in a line-of-sight (LOS), indoor office setting
were run over a number of distances and at a number of
transmit power levels in order for the correlation between
these factors and the Successful Key Reconciliation (SKR)
to be evaluated. The nodes were static during the key gen-
eration process and the environment was an office working
environment. The RSS values used are the ones measured and
reported by the CC2420 transceiver that constitute the TelosB
nodes under test. The CC2420 has a stated RSS dynamic
range of 100dB and a stated RSS accuracy of ±6dB with
RSS linearity of ±3dB. The graphs showing the observed
SKR vs distance relations can be seen in Figures 3 - 4. The
graphs also show the distance between nodes versus the SKR
rate at different transmit powers. Each curve in the graphs is
a third order polynomial best fit curve of the data points.
From the graphs, it is clear to see that the SKR is very high
(near 100%) at short distances but decreases with the distance
and also decreases with lower node transmit powers. These
results show that PL-SKG can be a suitable alternative for
the implementation of soft key generation in WSN nodes. In
particular, a key can be generated and used to refresh session
keys of a WSN node and in so doing help to enforce the
forward security of the WSN node. This would make it very
hard for an attacker who does not have all the keys generated
over all previous key generation sessions to discover the
current key.
As the distance between nalice and nbob increases, the signal-
to-noise (SNR) ratio at the receiving end decreases. This
decrease in SNR makes the estimation of the reciprocal
component of the channel (and hence the RSS) harder. From
the RSS we have RSS ≈ Pr + Pn ± 3. Here the ±3 dB
component is due to the stated linearity in the calculation
of RSS on the TelosB’s transceiver [17]. As the distance
increases (or the transmit power reduces) the receive power
(Pr) reduces. This reduction in Pr causes the share of the
non-reciprocal component of the RSS (Pn ± 3) to increase
as a proportion of the total RSS. This then causes bigger
disagreements in measured RSS between nalice and nbob.
This then reduces the SKR rate. This is clearly visible by
looking at the shapes of the curves in Figures 3 - 4.
In order to evaluate the performance of the proposed PL-
SKG scheme, we have implemented the most relevant and
representative PL-SKG scheme for WSNs, which is the
scheme in [4], for comparison. Current state-of-the-art PL-
SKG schemes for WSNs usually use a form of iterative
quantisation to achieve key reconciliation. A popular rep-
resentative example is the scheme proposed in [4]. Its key
reconcilement proceeds as follows. nalice chooses a value t
called the tolerance value and then quantises the observed
RSS samples with a quantisation level of ∆L = 2t (i.e.
rounds off each sample to the nearest multiple of ∆L). Node
nalice then sends the quantised values, the tolerance and the
difference between the quantised values and the observed
values to nbob. nbob then uses the information it has received
to quantise and then reconcile its key with nalice.
After the key reconcilliation stage nalice and nbob trade a
challenge-response message to ascertain if they have suc-
cessfully generated a common key. If the challenge-response
8 VOLUME 4, 2016
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI
10.1109/ACCESS.2018.2806423, IEEE Access
Moara-Nkwe et al.: Preparation of Papers for IEEE TRANSACTIONS and JOURNALS
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
log10(distance(cm))
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
1.1
SK
R
SKR with Transmit Power = 0dm
Proposed Scheme
Quantisation L = 4
Quantisation L = 3
FIGURE 3. Successful Key Reconcilliation Rate versus Node Distance at 0dm
for proposed scheme and for the scheme proposed by Wilhelm et. al [4] at
different quantisation levels.
fails, the value of ∆L is incremented and the key generation
process then loops back to the beginning key reconciliation
stage. This means that the quantisation interval is increased
with each iteration. This process continues until nalice and
nbob establish a common cryptographic key.
The PL-SKG scheme proposed in [4] was implemented and
experiments were conducted with the quantisation interval
fixed at ∆L, where ∆L ∈ {3, 4}. The results of the
experiments are shown alongside the results of the proposed
scheme in Figures 3 - 4. From the graphs it is clear that
the proposed scheme performs better than the scheme in
[4] for ∆L = 3 but slightly underperforms [4] for ∆L =
4. The scheme proposed in [4] (and other similar iterative
quantisation PL-SKG schemes) generally perform better as
∆L is increased but in the following section we will prove
that increasing values of ∆L in these schemes reduce key
entropy and thus stand to compromise security.
There have been a few proposed key generation schemes over
the past few years such as the one in [4] but our scheme
differs substantially from all the other practical schemes
for WSN nodes in a number of ways. Firstly, the biggest
difference is the use of ECCs to improve the error correcting
capability of key generation. ECCs have been proposed by
a number of papers for 802.11 networks but no practical
implementation of the approach has surfaced in the 802.15.4
landscape. The use of ECCs improves the scheme in a
number of ways. It allows the key reconciliation layer to be
designed and benchmarked separately to give a true layered
design approach. It also allows different ECCs to be removed
and placed depending on the power of the WSN node in
question. For example, if a more powerful WSN node is used,
the designer might opt to replace the hamming code used
in our scheme with a slightly more powerful ECC without
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FIGURE 4. Successful Key Reconcilliation Rate versus Node Distance at
-3dm for proposed scheme and for the scheme proposed by Wilhelm et. al [4]
at different quantisation levels.
running the risk of breaking the system.
Secondly, unlike the other schemes, our approach does not
quantise the RSS samples directly, so a mismatch with the
transmit power does not alter the key generation capability.
The only thing that matters in the key generation is the high
frequency components (the movements in the RSS sequence)
but not the DC component (the average RSS). This means
that nodes do not have to be set to the exact same transmit
power in the channel sampling stage for successful key
generation and refreshment to occur.
Thirdly, the scheme provides a mechanism on which to
generate new keys which uses not only the current state of
the physical layer but also previous session keys (and hence
indirectly using previous physical layer states). This helps
make the scheme forward and backward secure.
In other 802.15.4 PHY layer schemes such as in [4], a
single bit disagreement in the quantised RSS samples causes
the final key to disagree. These schemes combat this by
increasing the distance between quantisation levels until the
two keys agree, with no limit on how much the maximum
distance can be. This poses a security risk as the distance
between quantisation levels could potentially get very big.
In our scheme, errors are corrected a lot more efficiently
with the exact capability of the error decoding process being
clearly quantifiable.
IX. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. SECURITY COMPARISON OF KEY RECONCILIATION
IN PROPOSED SCHEME AND STATE-OF-THE-ART
PL-SKG SCHEMES
In this subsection we show that using iterative reconciliation
is inefficient and potentially insecure because the entropy of
a sequence quantised with quantisation level ∆L (X∆L) is
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lower than the entropy of the original observed sequence (X).
To do this we need to derive and analyse the value of α∆L for
increasing ∆L, where we define α∆L as the ratio defined in
9 below. The ratio of H(X) to H(X∆L) should be 1 to α∆L.
We first begin by getting an expression for α∆L for the case
where X is drawn from a uniform distribution. After this, we
will proceed to deriving α∆L in the general case and then
finally provide an expression of α∆L in the case where theX
are RSS values sampled from the RSS channel. In all cases
we will prove that α∆L is less 1 and hence the entropy of the
generated key inversely proportional to ∆L.
α∆L =
H(X∆L)
H(X)
(9)
In the case whereX is drawn from a uniform distribution and
X is the set of all possible outputs (i.e the range of X). The
number of elements in X is the cardinality of X (|X |). The
entropy of X can be evaluated as:
H(X) = −
∑
x
p(x) log p(x) = −
∑
x
1
|X | log
1
|X |
= log |X |
(10)
where p(x) = probability distribution of x. The quantisa-
tion operation rounds off values into the nearest multiple of
∆L and so it maps X to a set we denote as X∆L. This means
that the number of elements in X∆L is |X |/∆L. The entropy
of X∆L is then:
H(X∆L) = log
|X |
∆L
(11)
This then implies that α∆L = (1 − log|X |∆L) < 1 for the
case when X is drawn from a uniform distribution. The fact
that α∆L will always be less than 1 is due to the fact that
|X | > ∆L > 1, which causes the value of log|X |∆L to
always take a value in the range (0,1).
To get the expression of α∆L in the general case we first
define an integer Lm as being equal to |X |/∆L and X =
{1, 2, ..., |X|}. Quantising values in the range [1,Lm] yields
∆L and quantising values in the range [Lm+1 , 2Lm] yields
2∆L. Equation 12 shows how the quantisation process maps
X to X∆L in the general case.
X −−−→ X∆L
{1, ..., Lm, Lm + 1, ..., 2Lm, ...} −−−→ {∆L, 2∆L, ...}
(12)
The probability distribution over the set X∆L is p∆L(x),
where p∆L(x) can be calculated from p(x) using 13. We can
then calculate the value of H(X∆L) as shown in 14 and 15.
p∆L(x = n∆L) = p((n− 1)Lm + 1) + ...+ p(nLm)
=
∑nLm
x=(n−1)Lm+1
p(x)
(13)
H(X∆L) = −
∑
x∈X∆L
p∆L(x) log p∆L(x) (14)
H(X∆L) = −(P1 + ...+ PLm) log(P1 + ...+ PLm)− ...
−(P(∆L−1)Lm+1 + ...+ P|X |) log(P(∆L−1)Lm+1 + ...+ P|X |)
(15)
α∆L =
−(P1 + ...+ PLm) log(P1 + ...+ PLm)− ...
−P1 logP1 − P2 logP2 − ...
=
log(P1 + ...+ PLm)
(P1+...+PLm ) + ....
logPP11 P
P2
2 ...
=
log
∆L∏
n=1
(∑nLm
i=(n−1)Lm+1
Pi
)(∑nLm
i=(n−1)Lm+1Pi
)
log
|X |∏
i=1
PPii
(16)
The fact that α∆L is less than 1 is a consequence of the
mathematical inequality shown in 17. This proves that quan-
tisation will always reduce entropy of the original sequence,
with the ratio of the original entropy to the quantised entropy
being 1 : α∆L.
(n1+...+nM ) log(n1+...+nM ) < n1 log n1+...+nM log nM
(17)
To illustrate this point, a graphical representation of this
phenomenon is shown in figure 5. Figure 5 shows a sequence
of integers in the range [−4, 4] and graphs that result from
the quantisation of the sequence with ∆L = {2, 3, 4}. From
the graphs it is clear to see how using large quantisation
intervals is detrimental to security as the entropy and hence
the sequence variability of quantised signal is dramatically
reduced.
The linear received signal power is log-normally distributed
[22] and so its discrete form can be approximated by the log
binomial distribution [23]. The probability distribution p(x =
i) = Pi in the case when the RSS is what we are sampling
can thus be expressed as follows:
Pi =
(
n
i
)
pi(1− p)n−i (18)
where
n = Number of RSS samples (19)
σ = Standard Deviation =
√
np(1− p) (20)
The standard deviation (σ) varies depending on the exact
wireless communication environment but empirical studies
have estimated σ to be in the range of 5 to 12dB depending
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FIGURE 5. Figure showing how the quantisation level ∆L affects entropy.
on the environment [24].
The analysis above shows that iterative quantisation will
negatively affect entropy with increasing ∆L, with the rate
at which entropy degrades not only being a function of ∆L
but also dependent on the actual probability distribution of
RSS values. This is in contrast to ECC based reconciliation
which forces node nbob to reconcile its key to the original key
measured by node nalice and so does not necessarily reduce
the entropy of the key in the reconcilement stage.
B. RANDOMNESS TESTING
In order for keys to be used for cryptographic processes
it must be ensured that the generated keys have properties
of randomness. The randomness of the generated keys was
tested using the discrete frequency spectrum test, which is a
part of a standardised cryptographic randomness test [25].
The spectral test works by taking the discrete fourier trans-
form (DFT) of a bit stream and testing if the spectrum is sim-
ilar with the spectrum that would be obtained from a perfect
true randomness source. If a sequence is truly random, then
its spectrum will approximately be flat because there will be
no dominant frequency components. In addition to this, if a
spectrum is random, then 95% of the frequency domain sam-
ples will be less than a threshold T where T =
√
n log(20)
and n is the length of the sequence. The test works by first
FIGURE 6. Graph showing the spectrum of the key sequence and the location
of the 95% threshold.
calculating Nr, the mean number of samples in the spectrum
that would be below T in a truly random sequence and Ns,
the number of samples in the spectrum that are below T in the
sequence under test. The probability that the sequence under
test is truly random is then calculated using the deviation of
Ns from Nr. If that probability is over 99%, then sequence
under test is deemed to be random [25]. The test proceeds as
follows:
KeyStream = {k0‖k1‖...‖kNk−1} = x = {0, 1}n ⇔ {−1, 1}n
(21)
X = DFT(x) =
n∑
k=1
xe(j2pi(k−1)/n) =
n∑
k=1
f(k) (22)
p-value = 1− erf
( |d|√
2
)
(23)
where
j =
√−1 (24)
Nk = (Number Of Keys Under Test) (25)
n = Nk × (Number Of Bits Per Key) (26)
d =
Nr −Ns√
0.05Ns/2
(27)
Nr = 0.95× n (28)
Ns =
n∑
k=1
{
1 |f(k)| < T
0 |f(k)| > T (29)
erf(u) =
1
2pi
∫ u
0
e−t
2
dt (30)
A small p-value indicates strong evidence against our null
hypothesis (our null hypothesis is that the sequence under test
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is random). The NIST standard advises to accept a sequence
with a p-value greater than 0.01 as being random [25]. In
order to test randomness, 75 different keys were computed
and used to form a bit sequence of length 2400 bits. The
sequence was then tested using the spectral test. The obtained
spectrum can be seen in figure 6. The resultant p-value of the
tested bit stream was 0.589 which means the sequence has
randomness properties.
The keys were also tested to see if they are well correlated
in a static environment. In this test, 75 keys were computed
with a key refreshment period of one minute. For each key,
the correlation between itself and each of the other keys
was computed and the result plotted on the heat map shown
in figure 7. The correlation coefficient between two keys is
obtained by computing the cross correlation between the keys
and then taking the maximum correlation coefficient (CC)
from the resultant vector (this can be seen in 31). From figure
7 it is clear that different keys do not correlate highly with
each other between sessions on the vast majority of occa-
sions. The points in the map are keys which were generated
by legitimate parties nalice and nbob in the same session. Out
of all key correlations, there is only one rare occassion when
subsequent generated keys correlated highly and only one
other case of high correlation between key number 4 and key
number 9. These relatively rare high correlations could have
been caused by channel conditions not changing adequately
enough between key generation intervals.
keyA = x = {0, 1}n ⇔ {−1, 1}n
keyB = y = {0, 1}n ⇔ {−1, 1}n
CC = |ρxy|
(31)
where
ρxy =
E[xy]− E[x]E[y]√
E[x2]− [E[x]]2√E[y2]− [E[y]]2 (32)
C. SECURITY ANALYSIS AGAINST COMMON ATTACKS
It is also important to evaluate the security of the scheme
in order to understand the additional security benefits that
our scheme brings in relation to existing key refreshment
and generation schemes. The biggest threat facing sensor
networks is arguably brought about by the fairly recent drive
to connect them to the internet to create what is known as
the internet of things (IoT). Connecting devices in this way
leaves WSNs (which can have indirect access to the internet
via sinks / base stations) vulnerable to a wide range of attacks
from remote users who have access to much more powerful
computational resources.
It is important that we make sure that if the key material that
was originally deployed with the WSN and/or key material
used in a particular session is compromised by a remote user,
that user can not use that information to discover any key
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
ALICE KEYS
BO
B 
KE
YS
Normalised coorelation Between Alice and Bob Keys
 
 
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
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index should correlate highly).
material used in any other session. In other words, we want
our scheme to achieve perfect forward and backward security.
A type of attack that WSNs are particularly vulnerable to
are man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks. The most direct way
an adversary could try and compromise the process is by
trying to snoop on communications between nalice and nbob
and then running going through the key generation process
to generate a key. Tests were done with a third node, neve,
being a distance of 2m away from nbob. nalice and nbob went
through the key generation process 75 times with neve also
trying to generate a key from messages sent from nalice. The
correlation coefficient of the keys obtained from nbob and
neve are shown in figure 8. From the figure it is clear that the
correlation between keys generated at nalice and neve was not
high, showing that this scheme can be used even in relatively
dense WSN deployments.
The case outlined above is the case where neve is passive.
In an active case, neve will try and inject/broadcast to nalice
and/or nbob. In this case, allowing only packets that have been
appended with a message authentication code (MAC) to be
used in the key reconciliation process will prevent malicious
packets from being injected by neve. In the event that neve
tries to influence the wireless environment by flooding the
channel with malicious packets and in so doing raising the
RSS of received packets received in particular time intervals,
nalice and nbob need to monitor the quality of the link
between them by looking at the link quality indicator. An
increase in RSS should correspond to an increase in LQI, so
any inverse relationship between RSS and LQI will indicate
some possible malicious activity.
There is also the possibility of an adversary trying to disrupt
the process by jamming the wireless channel. This could be
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FIGURE 8. Correlation Coefficients between Legitimate and Adversary Keys,
D = 2m.
done in two ways, i) the jammer might just jam the particular
802.15.4 channel being transmitted on by transmitting high
power noise or ii) the attacker could flood the channel with
802.15.4 compliant packets. In the first case the 2.4GHz
802.15.4 PHY layer provides an inbuilt defence for this
using direct sequence spread spectrum (DSSS) technology.
DSSS works by encoding the bits to be sent with another
pseudo random spreading bit sequence of a substantially
higher data rate than the data sequence and then transmitting
the result instead of transmitting the bits directly. Doing
this has the effect of spreading the information sent over
a large bandwidth and in so doing preventing narrowband
indiscriminate jammers.
In the event of an adversary flooding the channel with
802.15.4 compliant packets, the use of DSSS will not prevent
the attack. Relying on the MAC only will not prevent the
attack as each malicious packet will need to be received,
leading to denial of service. In this case of the attack, actions
need to be taken at the physical layer to minimise the impact.
When the PHY layer transmits a packet, it prepends the
packet with a synchronisation (SYNC) header. The header
does not contain any application specific information, it
is used to make sure the transceiver’s communicating can
synchronise before the actual packet information starts. The
SYNC header used in the CC2420 is shown in Fig 9.
In order to minimise the impact of flooding attacks, legit-
imate parties could switch from the default 802.15.4 syn-
chronisation header value of 0x00007A and use a different
header unique value on a per packet basis when generating
keys. A unique SYNC header value will prevent flooding
attacks because packet information (e.g destination address,
packet length etc.) will not even be read if the expected
SYNC header preamble and received SYNC header preamble
                                            CC2420 
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additional zero symbols in SYNCWORD 
make CC2420 compliant with [1]. 
In reception, CC2420 synchronises to 
received zero-symbols and searches for 
the SFD sequence defined by the 
SYNCWORD register. The least significant 
symbols in SYNCWORD set to 0xF will be 
ignored, while symbols different from 0xF 
will be required for synchronisation. The 
default setting of 0xA70F thereby requires 
one additional zero-symbol for 
synchronisation. This will reduce the 
number of false frames detected due to 
noise.  
The following illustrates how the 
programmed synch word is interpreted 
during reception by CC2420: If SYNCWORD = 
0xA7FF, CC2420 will require the incoming 
symbol sequence of (from left to right) 0 7 
A. If SYNCWORD = 0xA70F, CC2420 will 
require the incoming symbol sequence of 
(from left to right) 0 0 7 A. If SYNCWORD = 
0xA700, CC2420 will require the incoming 
symbol sequence of (from left to right) 0 0 
0 7 A. 
In receive mode CC2420 uses the 
preamble sequence for symbol 
synchronisation and frequency offset 
adjustments. The SFD is used for byte 
synchronisation, and is not part of the data 
stored in the receive buffer (RXFIFO). 
 
0 7 AIEEE 802.15.4
Preamble SFD
CC2420 2·(PREAMBLE_LENGTH + 1) zero symbols
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
SW0
SW0 = SYNCWORD[3:0]
SW1 = SYNCWORD[7:4]
SW2 = SYNCWORD[11:8]
SW3 = SYNCWORD[15:12]
SW1 SW2 SW3
if different from 'F', else '0'
if different from 'F', else '0'
if different from 'F', else '0'
if different from 'F', else '0'
Synchronisation Header
Each box corresponds to 4 bits. Hence the preamble corresponds to 8 x 4 ''0' s or 4 bytes with the value 0.
 
Figure 18. Transmitted Synchronisation Header 
 
16.2 Length field 
The frame length field shown in Figure 17 
defines the number of bytes in the MPDU. 
Note that the length field does not include 
the length field itself. It does however 
include the FCS (Frame Check 
Sequence), even if this is inserted 
automatically by CC2420 hardware. It also 
includes the MIC if authentication is used. 
The length field is 7 bits and has a 
maximum value of 127. The most 
significant bit in the length field is reserved 
[1], and should be set to zero. 
CC2420 uses the length field both for 
transmission and reception, so this field 
must always be included. In transmit 
mode, the length field is used for 
underflow detection, as described in the 
FIFO access section on page 31. 
16.3 MAC protocol data unit 
The FCF, data sequence number and 
address information follows the length field 
as shown in Figure 17. Together with the 
MAC data payload and Frame Check 
Sequence, they form the MAC Protocol 
Data Unit (MPDU). 
The format of the FCF is shown in Figure 
19. Please refer to [1] for details. 
Not Recommended For New Designs
FIGURE 9. Synchronisation Header (Source [17]).
differ by more than a set threshold of bits (this threshold is
configurable on the tr ceiver). The SYNC value is sent as
plaintext and so would need to change synchronously on a per
packet basis in order to foil attacks from ophisticated d nial
of service attackers who are snooping on SYNC headers and
also flooding at the same time.
We now consider another attack scenario where the current
session key is Kj and an adversary com romises the key
mat rial rom a previous session Ki. If we had j st hashed
the key (together with other deterministic information) when
moving to new sessions in order to refresh keys, as is the
case with current WSN deployments, then session keys that
were used before Ki would not be computable because a
hash is irreversible but all session keys that come after Ki
(including Kj) could be easily computed from Ki by just
applying successive hashes. This is a major problem because
if any time in the future the original key material K0 that the
WSN was deployed with is compromised, then all the session
keys that have ever been used would be at risk. If, on the other
hand, our proposed scheme is used, then the compromise of
any session key will not compromise any other session key as
the adversary will not be able to evaluate the physical layer
values that were used to refresh session keys. This is because
the adversary would have no access to the values of fi in 8.
A big advantage of a PL-SKG scheme is that an adversary
who has not been locally there throughout the entire lifespan
of the WSN network will find it very difficult to compromise
a key, even if they know all the key information loaded on
nodes at deployment.
X. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER WORK
This paper has discussed and highlighted the key challenges
that are faced when trying to design and implement PL-
SKG schemes on WSNs. We have shown that there still exist
opportunities to increase the key generation rates of current
schemes by exploiting the fading characteristics of chips over
communication channels. We have also proposed a novel PL-
SKG scheme and implemented it on real nodes enabling two
parties to generate and refresh pair-wise keys. Experiments
have shown that the proposed PL-SKG scheme has a high
key agreement rate and that the generated key decorrelates
quickly with respect to distance.
The proposed PL-SKG scheme in this paper is suitable for
use in static channels. The scheme uses filtering and ECCs
to generate and refresh cryptographic keys using RSS mea-
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surements. Privacy amplification is carried out in a manner
that ensures both perfect forward and backward security.
Thus any compromised session key material (including all
the initial key information the nodes were deployed with)
does not compromise key material in any other session.
This paper also analyses the security of the both state-
of-the-art PL-SKG schemes and our proposed scheme and
proves that the existing iterative quantisation used for key
reconciliation purposes reduces key entropy. Further security
analysis against a variety of attack vectors was also carried
out to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of our PL-
SKG scheme, and proposals of practical measures that help
prevent and/or mitigate the effects of these attacks on a WSN
network were put forward. Further work could be done to
incorporate the key generation and refreshment capabilities
of the proposed scheme in full key recovery protocols.
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